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This paper proposes an encoding system for 1D biomedical signals that allows embedding metadata and
provides security and privacy. The design is based on the analysis of requirements for secure and efﬁcient
storage, transmission and access to medical tests in e-health environment. This approach uses the 1D SPI-
HT algorithm to compress 1D biomedical signals with clinical quality, metadata embedding in the com-
pressed domain to avoid extra distortion, digital signature to implement security and attribute-level
encryption to support Role-Based Access Control. The implementation has been extensively tested using
standard electrocardiogram and electroencephalogram databases (MIT-BIH Arrhythmia, MIT-BIH Com-
pression and SCCN-EEG), demonstrating high embedding capacity (e.g. 3 KB in resting ECGs, 200 KB in
stress tests, 30 MB in ambulatory ECGs), short delays (2–3.3 s in real-time transmission) and compression
of the signal (by ’3 in real-time transmission, by ’5 in ofﬂine operation) despite of the embedding of
security elements and metadata to enable e-health services.
 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Medical tests need to evolve in the context of e-health [1] to-
wards the new patient-centric paradigm of healthcare [2], which
is supported by the Information and Communication Technologies
(ICT). The core of these tests are biomedical signals (e.g. an electro-
cardiogram or an electroencephalogram), whose clinical meaning
need to be complemented with additional information (annota-
tions about the signal, personal data of the patient, his/her health
status, allergies, medication) to enable his/her early diagnosis, con-
tinuous follow-up and customized care. To do so, and to guarantee
adequate data availability (comprising secure and efﬁcient storage,
exchange and access), a method combining optimal encoding and
protection of medical tests must be investigated. The resulting pro-
tected tests may facilitate the development of new secure ICT-
based health services or the upgrade of existing (e.g. home moni-
toring, decision support systems, wearable sensor networks, e-pre-
scribing [3]).
The requirements that digital medical tests must fulﬁll to ﬁt the
new e-health paradigm may be summarized as:
 Information associated to the signal. Without appropriate
data, identifying the signal and enabling its interpreta-tion, medical tests may become useless. For this reason
the information in medical tests must be arranged as
metadata using some data structure and bound to the
signal to difﬁcult its lost.
 Signal compression. Algorithms for signal compression
remove redundancies contained by signals at different lev-
els. These algorithms can be divided into two main catego-
ries: lossless, which retrieve the original signal; and lossy,
which reach higher compression ratios than lossless at the
cost of decreasing signal ﬁdelity. The latter are more inter-
esting since they permit saving much more bandwidth in
transmission and disk space in storage. Nevertheless, in
clinical applications the compression ratio must be limited
by measurable quality parameters to hold the clinical
meaning of the signal and avoid changing its diagnostic
interpretation. Among lossy methods, there are three
modalities [4]: direct methods (basing their detection of
redundancies on direct analysis of the actual signal sam-
ples), transformation methods (mainly utilizing spectral
and energy distribution analysis for detecting redundan-
cies) and parameter extraction techniques (e.g. measure-
ment of the probability distribution, subsequently
utilized for classiﬁcation based on a priori knowledge of
the signal features). The second modality (e.g. discrete
cosine transform [5], Karhunen-Loève transform [6], wave-
lets [7], etc.) generally yields better results, especially the
wavelets, which provide a time–frequency representation
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domains. Furthermore, the wavelet coefﬁcients can also be
compressed by exploiting their similarity, as the SPIHT algo-
rithm does [8], in order to increase the ﬁnal compression ratio.
 Security and privacy in storage and during transmission.
Current legal regulations (the HIPAA [9], the PIPEDA [10],
the LOPD [11], the Digital Signature Laws in several coun-
tries) demand that any personal health information must
be protected, using adequate cryptographic means. The
basic requirements are (1) encrypting all private data, (2)
embedding a digital signature to verify data integrity and
authenticate the signatory, and (3) encrypting the commu-
nications. Steganography may be used as a complement to
introduce security or secret elements silently. Watermark-
ing, marking all objects in the same way (e.g. to demon-
strate ownership) and ﬁngerprinting, marking each object
speciﬁcally (e.g. to identify legitimate users) are the most
typical applications of steganography.
 Role-Based Access Control. E-health services operate in scenar-
ios with a variety of different stakeholders: patients, relatives,
paramedics, nurses, primary care doctors/general practitio-
ners, surgeons, medical specialists and subspecialists, teach-
ers and medical students, researchers, laboratories,
insurance companies, governmental oversight agencies, and
non-governmental oversight. For the same patient, the infor-
mation that each user is allowed to access must depend on
his role: e.g. if the patient has AIDS, the nurses and the para-
medics need to know, but probably not the researchers using
his/her medical tests. Attribute-level encryption and de-iden-
tiﬁcation are effective ways to overcome this issue.
 Low complexity encoding and short access time. Since the cur-
rent tendency is building portable medical devices and wear-
able sensors, which often mount low power processors, the
algorithms for encoding and protection should be as simple
as possible to not overload them with complex calculations
and reduce demand on the battery. Besides, fast execution
and transmission are requirements to maintain availability
of the test at good levels and allow real-time services.
There are many publications approaching these requisites sep-
arately (see for example [12–14] for signal compression, [15,16]
for data embedding into signals and [17–21] for signal security).
However, the aim of this work is to ﬁnd an encoding and access
system harmonizing compression, embedding and security. It will
be focused on the case of 1D signals to facilitate the evaluation, but
it could also be extended to signals of higher dimension. The rest of
the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 depicts our proposal,
which is evaluated in Section 3 with standard signal databases.
The system implementation built for the evaluation is presented
in Section 4. Finally the results are analyzed in Section 5, extracting
conclusions and discussing future lines of work.
2. Materials and methods
The outline of the new encoding and access architecture for 1D
biomedical tests is represented in Fig. 1. To fulﬁll the requirements
in Section 1, it implements adequate methods for signal compres-
sion and embedding of additional measures, data of the patient and
elements to provide security and privacy. The chosen compressor
(Section 2.1) is not only fast and efﬁcient but it also facilitates
the embedding process (Section 2.2), in which security items are
introduced together with the data (Section 2.3) to limit access to
it. Real-time encoding and access is feasible since the encoder
works with length-adjustable signal blocks (and additional mea-
sures) to constrain the delays, producing encoded units called sig-
nal registers. Then, these are sent to the Picture Archive andCommunication System (PACS), whose admin checks their integ-
rity and authenticity and accesses the private data of the patient.
Next, the signal registers are stored according to the PACS data
model (e.g. patient/study/series/instance like in DICOM [22]).
When this test is requested to the PACS by a user, it will be sent
preserving its encoding, which ensures that the user can access
only those contents authorized by his/her professional role. Be-
sides, the signal may also be reconstructed by any user knowing
the compression method, even if the presence of the embedded
data is ignored. Finally, users who know the encoding can always
access the embedded additional measures and detect corruption
of the signal or the contents.
The former experience of the authors with medical protocols
[23–26] and ECG signals [27,28] and the opinion of three indepen-
dent physicians has inspired this architecture.2.1. Signal compression
Among the variety of general methods for biomedical signal
compression, the combination of wavelets and SPIHT not only ob-
tains good results, it is also simple and returns a bitframe which
can be truncated at any point with progressive lossy to lossless
quality. Another outstanding property is that large amounts of data
can be embedded and retrieved from truncated SPIHT bitframes
with simplicity and secrecy.2.1.1. SPIHT overview
SPIHT was ﬁrstly presented in [8] as an efﬁcient method for
coding wavelet coefﬁcients in image (2-D) compression. In [12]
the algorithm was adapted to the one-dimensional (1-D) case
and applied to ECG signals, revealing that it was very efﬁcient in
compression and in computation when compared with previous
ECG compression methods. Besides the SPIHT algorithm accounted
with several desirable properties: multiresolution scalability, pro-
gressive lossy to lossless coding, compatibility with lossless entro-
py coding, low complexity (use of simple operators), moderate
memory usage and symmetric coding-decoding. These features
motivated the later extension of the algorithm to the three-dimen-
sional (3-D) [29] and four-dimensional (4-D) cases [30], and its
successful VLSI implementation in silicon for ECG real-time com-
pression in low-power applications [31].
The principles of the SPIHT algorithm are partial ordering of
the transform coefﬁcients by magnitude with a set partitioning
sorting algorithm, ordered bit plane transmission and exploitation
of self-similarity across different layers. By following these princi-
ples, the encoder always transmits the most signiﬁcant bit to the
decoder.
Basically the (1-D) algorithm uses a temporal orientation tree
structure to deﬁne the temporal parent-offspring relations in
the wavelet domain, across consecutive layers. The set partition-
ing rule creates subset of subband coefﬁcients ci, whose indices
will be used together with the coefﬁcient indices (referred to as
points) to create and update three related lists: the list of insig-
niﬁcant points (LIP), the list of insigniﬁcant sets (LIS), and the list
of signiﬁcant points (LSP). The outline of the algorithm is as
follows:
1. Initialization. Set the list of signiﬁcant points (LSP) as
empty. Set the roots of similarity trees in the list of insignif-
icant points (LIP) and insigniﬁcant sets (LIS). Set the signif-
icance threshold 2n with n = blog2(max(i)jci)c.
2. Sorting pass. Using the set partitioning algorithm distribute the
appropriate indices of the coefﬁcients to the LIP, LIS, and LSP.
3. Reﬁnement pass. For each entry in the LSP signiﬁcant for
higher n, send the nth most signiﬁcant bit to the decoder.
Fig. 1. Scheme for the encoding and access to 1D biomedical tests in e-health environments. Signal registers are depicted in Fig. 2.
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bitrate or distortion is reached.
A more detailed explanation of the algorithm can be found in
[12].
2.1.2. Compression and distortion in SPIHT
Before compressing, the original signal is divided into contigu-
ous non-overlapping blocks to boost the compression, reduce
memory demandings and allow real-time services. Adequate blocklength values, balancing bandwidth requirements and delays, are
discussed in Section 3.3.
Bounding distortion using SPIHT is a simple task if we use the
fact that the Euclidean norm, which is used to measure the error,
is invariant to the wavelet transform (since it is a unitary transfor-
mation). Thus, guaranteeing reconstruction quality can be easily
done by controlling the value of the coded coefﬁcients and calcu-
lating some distortion measure to stop the coding process when
the desired distortion level is reached [27,28]. This is detailed in
Section 3.2.
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The embedding and retrieval of metadata (e.g. data of the pa-
tient, additional measures of the test, security items) in the SPI-
HT domain presents great advantages: high capacity, very low
complexity and controllable signal distortion. As illustrated in
Fig. 2, the metadata bits are placed after the SPIHT bitframe
(to minimize distortion). These bits are kept for signal recon-
struction, providing a common access to the signal regardless
whether the user knows the encoding method (thus, the pres-
ence of additional contents) or just the compression algorithm,
as illustrated in Fig. 1. The change in the quality of the recon-
structed signal due to this extension of the SPIHT bitframe is
low or moderate, as it will be shown in Section 3.3. Besides
when it decreases, the SPIHT bitframe is progressively extended
with new SPIHT bits until this negative effect is balanced out. It
is not necessary to reconstruct the signal in the time domain to
update the distortion when extending the SPIHT. This is feasible
in the transform domain since the wavelet is a unitary transfor-
mation, and practical because the wavelet coefﬁcients were al-
ready calculated for compression.Fig. 2. Structure and content of a signal register. Additional measures and data of the pati
the access data to be included in each user’s entry of the Private Access Table. By using h
authorized by his/her RBAC proﬁle. Digital Signatures (DS) are used for authentication a2.3. Metadata encoding, protection and access
Organizing and protecting the metadata to be embedded within
the signal registers (see Fig. 1) are basic requirements to guarantee
that corruption of the signal or the metadata can be detected and
that access to the latter is suitably controlled. Although the Cryp-
tographic Message Syntax [32] (implemented by DICOM) provide
the means to digitally sign, digest, authenticate or encrypt any dig-
ital content, it presents disadvantages that the signal registersmust
avoid: the syntax to protect each piece of data is not separated
from it, control the access of different users is costly and it pro-
duces too much overhead.
The proposed encoding is depicted in Fig. 2 by means of an
example. At the end of each signal register there is a tail, composed
of two bytes, which points at the beginning of the secure frame to
allow its retrieval. The secure frame is composed of:
 a recovery container (RC, mandatory in the ﬁrst signal regis-
ter), which includes the syntax necessary to make the con-
tent of each data container retrievable to targeted users (or
to everybody);ent are put into separated containers (1–4) and ciphered. The RBAC proﬁles establish
is/her private key, a user deciphers his/her access data and retrieves the containers
nd checking the integrity of the RC and the signal registers.
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context-related metadata about the test (e.g. cont. 1: ECG
delineation, cont. 2: allergies, cont. 3: patient ID, cont. 4:
general data and health status of the patient); and
 a Digital Signature (DS, mandatory), which allows the
detection of tampering.
2.3.1. Protection scheme
The recovery container, depicted in Table 1, details the sym-
metric (tag 3) and asymmetric elements (tag 0–2) combined in
the protection scheme to obtain an optimum tradeoff security-per-
formance. Tags 4–5 indicate the position of container 1 to allow
public access and tag 6 contains the Private Access Table, which
regulates the private access to the rest of containers (2–6).
The data containers, as illustrated in Fig. 2, are ciphered inde-
pendently with symmetric cryptography, which operates very fast.
A secret key (ki) and a initialization vector (IV) are used for cipher-
ing and deciphering, which provides conﬁdentiality. The symmet-
ric cipherer (Table 1: tag 3 – AES [36], Blowﬁsh, RC6, Twoﬁsh or
3DES) operates in Output Feedback Mode (OFB), which makes
cryptanalysis more difﬁcult and does not require extra bytes for
padding. The preferred cipherer is the standard AES, expected to
remain secure beyond 2030 (according to NIST [33]) and faster
than the rest in generation of keys and ciphering [34]. Asymmetric
cryptography, which is safer and does not need previous key
arrangements to start, is used to protect the symmetric key, posi-
tion and length of each container (Table 1: tag 6), obtaining conﬁ-
dentiality and authentication. This uses a key pair (public key,
private key) for ciphering and deciphering. Regarding algorithms,
only the widespread RSA [37] is permitted, since its major compet-
itor, elGamal, is not a standard and encrypts more slowly. The ac-
cess procedure is as follows:
 For the non-conﬁdential container 1, its symmetric key (k1) and
initialization vector (IV) are obtained from a public security ele-
ment, the Digital Signature (DS) of the RC (Table 1: tag 2). The
key corresponds to the ﬁrst bits (e.g. for AES, from 1 to 256)
and the IV to the following (e.g. for AES, from 257 to 384).
The length (Table 1: tag 4) and position of this container are also
public, it begins just after the RC in the ﬁrst signal register and
after the SPIHT bits in the remaining (Table 1: tag 5). Thus, this
container can be accessed by anyone knowing this encoding.
 For the conﬁdential containers 2–6, their symmetric keys (ki)
and locations (positions and lengths) make private entries in
the Private Access Table (PAT, Table 1: tag 6), encrypted with
the public RSA key of the intended user/s. Each user decodes
his/her entry in the PAT using his/her private key. The IV is
the same as for container 1. There are noisy bytes preceding
the containers to increase the cost of an attack due to the secrecy
of their locations.
The Digital Signatures (DS) included in each signal register
(Fig. 2) and in the RC (Table 1: tag 2) are used to check their integ-
rity and authenticity. The DS are calculated by combining a safe
hash function (Table 1: tag 1 – SHA2 512, SHA 1 or RIPEMD 160)
which makes a digest of the RC/signal register, with a public-key
algorithm, which encrypts the digest with the private key of the
agent who protects the test (a person, a program or the signal
acquisition device itself). At user’s side, each DS is veriﬁed by calcu-
lating the hash of the received RC/signal register and comparing it
with the original hash, decrypted with the public key of the agent
(extracted from his/her digital certiﬁcate, Table 1: tag 0). If they
match the RC/signal register is valid, otherwise all signal registers/
that signal register are refused. Regarding algorithms, RSA [37] is
not allowed since the signatures are lengthy, DSA [38] is permittedsince it is very extended and its signature is very compact (see Sec-
tion 3.3), and ECDSA [39] is the preferred option since the signa-
ture length is the same as DSA and its key, and consequently its
digital certiﬁcate, is much shorter (see Table 4).
2.3.2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Since biomedical tests may be requested for different uses (e.g.
diagnosis, research, teaching), the implementation of a RBAC policy
deﬁning different access proﬁles is a smart way to fulﬁll the pri-
vacy principles of necessity of data processing and purpose bind-
ing. The agent (person, program or acquisition device) will assign
a RBAC proﬁle to each intended user, according to his/her profes-
sional role, to establish the contents of the test that he/she is al-
lowed to access. These policies have gained attention in recent
years and currently they are integrated in several medical stan-
dards (e.g. DICOM [40] and HL7 [41]).
As illustrated in Fig. 2, the proposed RBAC policy is deﬁned on
top of the formerly described container-level encryption, which al-
ready allowed different users to access different contents (placed
into separated containers) of a signal register. A possible deﬁnition
for the containers, integrating the most interesting contents in-
cluded by major medical standards (DICOM [22], HL7 [42], SCP-
ECG [43] and MFER [44]), would be:
 Container 1. This may include information concerning the
acquisition session:
– context-aware data (e.g. type of test: resting ECG, stress ECG,
ambulatory ECG monitoring, intensive care monitoring);
– environmental parameters (e.g. positioning, humidity,
temperature);
– parameters of the signal (e.g. sampling frequency, quan-
tization bits, amplitude multiplier, applied ﬁlters);
– additional data extracted after signal processing (e.g.
delineation of ﬁducial points in an ECG record, intervals
of likely seizure in EEGs);
– periodic measures acquired in intensive care monitoring
(e.g. non-invasive blood pressure – NiBP, temperature –
Temp, blood oxygen saturation – SPO2, carbon dioxide –
CO2, heart rate);
– periodic measures acquired in stress tests (e.g. maximal
oxygen consumption – VO2, heart rate, concentration of
lactate in the blood, carbon dioxide production – VCO2,
speed of the treadmill/power of the bicycle).
 Container 2. This may include the identiﬁcation of the patient
(e.g. name, surname, Social Security Number, Personal Health
Record identiﬁer), the physician/technician who acquires the
signal, the acquiring and analyzing devices and the institu-
tion (and/or department) that leads the test.
 Container 3. This may include general data (e.g. age, height,
weight) and health status of the patient (e.g. diseases,
symptoms, previous diagnoses, observations).
 Container 4. This may include the allergies and current
medication of the patient.
 Container 5. This may include sensitive diseases of the
patient (e.g. AIDS, venereal diseases), not included in con-
tainer 3 for conﬁdentiality reasons.
 Container 6. This may include billing information of the
medical test.
The corresponding RBAC proﬁles were deﬁned after consulting
medical experts and they aim at covering the spectrum of applica-
tions for tests in the e-health context:
0. Emergency care/surgery: access to signals, all personal and
medical data of the patient, containers 1–5.
Table 1
Structure and content of the recovery container (RC). ([35]See below-mentioned references for further information.)
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to signals, all personal and medical data, excluding sensi-
tive diseases not related to the current test, containers 1–4.
2. Research or examination (by another physician caring for
the patient): access to signals and medical data of the
patient preserving his/her anonymity, containers 1, 3, 4.
3. Teaching: access to signals and general health status of the
patient to enable correlations, containers 1, 3.
4. Billing: access to signals and information about the cost of
the acquisition session, containers 1, 6.
5. Signals consultation: access to signals only and container 1.
This proﬁle is public, available to everyone.
Nonetheless, the proposed encoding can work with different
number and alternative deﬁnitions of containers and RBAC proﬁles,
it is not speciﬁcally intended for these examples only.
3. Evaluation
The methods selected for signal compression (Section 2.1),
metadata embedding (Section 2.2) and protection (Section 2.3) de-
pend on several parameters (e.g. signal distortion threshold, signal
block length, wavelet decomposition level, DS type) which must be
studied and set up to ensure (a) user satisfaction: signal ﬁdelity,
low delays (to allow real-time operation), ease of use of the imple-
mentation (see Section 4) and (b) optimal system features: low
bandwidth requirements, low overhead of the security elements
and enough embedding capacity to include data produced in e-
health services.
A variety of electrocardiograms (ECGs), commonly used for the
detection and diagnosis of heart disease, and electroencephalo-
grams (EEGs), relevant in applications such as brain-computer
interfaces and the study of epilepsy and sleep disorders (insomnia,
circadian rhythm disorders, parasomnia, etc.) are used to carry out
all the parts of this evaluation.
3.1. Databases
Two well-known ECG databases have been used. The ﬁrst one is
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)-Beth Israel Hospi-
tal (BIH) Arrhythmia [45]. This ECGdatabase consists of 48 two-lead
ECG registers of 30 min duration. The sampling rate is 360 samples
per second with a resolution of 11 bits per sample. Although the
database was originally created as standard test material for the
evaluation of arrhythmia detectors, this database is by far the most
used to test and compare ECG compression algorithms. The second
ECG database is MIT-BIH Compression [45]. It is composed of 168
two-lead ECG records of 20.48 s duration. The sampling rate is
250 samples/s with a resolution of 12 bits per sample. This database
was created to pose a variety of challenges for ECG compressors, in
particular for lossy compression methods. Despite this fact, it is
scarcely used to test the ECG compression algorithms, being rele-
gated by MIT-BIH arrhythmia. Since these ECG databases are com-
posed of two-lead recordings, the entire evaluation was run on
both leads and the results represent the average.
For testing with EEGs we chose the STUDY dataset [46,47] from
the Swartz Center for Computational Neuroscience (SCCN), com-
posed of 10 recordings from 5 different subjects, with 61 channels
per frame, 820 frames per epoch and 220–235 epochs. The sam-
pling rate of these recordings is 200 samples/s and the resolution
is 11 bits per sample.
3.2. Bounding signal distortion
Fidelity of a compressed signal is understood as the close simi-
larity with respect to the original. In clinical applications, it isessential to measure the distance between both signals by means
of some distortion measure and setting a quality threshold to reg-
ulate the compression process. Among the most widespread mea-
sures of signal distortion are:
 the Root Mean Square error (RMS), deﬁned asRMS ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðxðnÞ  ~xðnÞÞ2
N
s
; and ð1Þ the Percentage RMS Distortion (PRD), deﬁned asPRD ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPN
n¼1ðxðnÞ  ~xðnÞÞ2PN
n¼1ðxðnÞ  xÞ2
s
 100; ð2Þwhere x(n) is the original signal, ~xðnÞ is the reconstructed, x the
mean of the original signal and N its length.
It can be observed in Eq. (1) how the amplitude range of the sig-
nal affects the measure: compressed signals constrained to lower
amplitudes obtain lower RMS than those with higher amplitude
and the same ﬁdelity. The deﬁnition of PRD in Eq. (2) overcomes
this issue because it uses a normalization which is independent
from the amplitude of the signal (and from its DC level). Thus,
our choice is using the PRD as the measure of signal distortion,
since it allows much fairer comparisons.
Furthermore, the correlation between the PRD and the mean
opinion score (MOS) of expert cardiologists, obtained through
blind and semi blind tests, was studied by Zigel in [48]. One of
the conclusions of that work was that all tested signals with
PRD < 9% were considered as ‘‘good’’ or ‘‘very good’’ by the cardiol-
ogists. Thus, this value is used as quality threshold for ECG com-
pression in our system. Similarly, other works relate PRD to EEG
quality. In [49] it is suggested limiting PRD to 7% to maintain
99.5% of the signal energy, while in [50] it is proposed rising to
30% since this value allows a seizure detection rate of 90% to be
reached in epilepsy monitoring (using REACT, a state-of-the-art
algorithm). Among these two values, 7% is preferred since EEG re-
cords may be used in applications requiring higher quality than
seizure detection. Fig. 3 shows two signals from our databases,
an ECG and an EEG, which are compressed with the proposed
thresholds and retain their main shapes accurately.
3.3. System delays and bandwidth requirements
The delays of the proposed encoding and access system are esti-
mated in Table 2. The overall delay is mainly contributed by the la-
tency of acquiring a signal block, expressible as:
block lengthðsÞ ¼ block length ð#samplesÞ
sampling freq: ð#samples=sÞ ; ð3Þ
In fact, in all the conﬁgurations presented this delay is much greater
than the sum of delays of the remaining processes (see Table 2: sub-
total). This enables real-time operation on the condition of signal
blocks as short as possible to maintain the delay at acceptable
levels.
The bandwidth required for the transmission of encoded ECG
and EEG signals when embedding security elements (mandatory)
and additional metadata (optional) is evaluated in Table 3. Four
observations were made. First, using long signal blocks produces
a decrease in signal bandwidth requirements which stops at
4096 samples/block for ECGs, in the case of EEGs higher values
can improve the compression at the cost of very high delays
(>20.48 s according to Eq. (3)). Long signal blocks allowmore signal
cycles to be included in a single block, lower frequencies obtain
higher relevance and this beneﬁts the sorting of the temporal
Fig. 3. Signals (a) 08730_2 (lead 1) ECG from MIT–BIH Compression (bitrate
3000 bps), (b) compressed with PRD = 9% (bitrate 202 bps), (c) Syn08-s254 EEG from
SSCN (bitrate 2200 bps), and (d) compressed with PRD = 7% (bitrate 240 bps).
Additional parameters: block length = 512 samples, wavelet decomposition level
= 6.
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ciency of the compression. Second, the signal bandwidth require-
ments increase slightly (64%) when embedding a big amount of
metadata (three last columns in Table 3). Nevertheless this only
happens in the ﬁrst signal register, since the rest do not include con-
tainers 2–6. Third, using long signal blocks dramatically reduces the
metadata bandwidth requirements since, in each signal register,
the size of the security elements with respect to the size of the en-
coded signal block is lower. Fourth, the encoded signal compresses
the original (compression rate > 1) despite embedding security
elements and metadata. The only exception appears in the ﬁrst sig-
nal registerwhen using short signal blocks (512 samples/block) and
embedding more than 3 KB in containers 2–6.
The size of the contents arranged in secure frames and subse-
quently embedded within signal registers for the bandwidth evalu-
ation above are depicted in Table 4. The chosen agent’s certiﬁcate
type for DS was ECDSA 239 and we considered the case of 5 users
with RSA 1024 certiﬁcates when embedding containers 2–6. For
ECGs, the container 1 included the signal delineation and additional
measures obtained from a stress test (VO2, heart rate, concentra-
tion of lactate in the blood, VCO2 and speed of the treadmill). For
EEGs, the container 1 included a likelihood measure for EEG seizure
detection and additional monitoring measures (NiBP, Temp, SPO2,
CO2 and heart rate). The ECG delineation consisted of the position
of 15 ﬁducial points (wave onsets, peaks and offsets) per cardiac
cycle, each point encoded with 2 bytes. EEG seizure detection like-
lihood was estimated every second and encoded using 1 byte. Each
additional measure was recorded at 1 sample/s and encoded using
1 byte. For containers 2–6 we estimated that its overall size is
around 3–10 KB. Although they store a lot of different medical data
(see Section 2.3:RBAC), most of it can be described by means of IDs.3.3.1. Parameters tuning
As demonstrated above, the length of the signal block estab-
lishes a tradeoff between the system overall delay and the band-
width required for the transmission. Therefore two different
values are recommended according to the application. 512 samples/block for real-time transmission, which yields
acceptable delays (see Table 2: total) and low signal transmis-
sion rates (see Table 3): MIT-Arrhythmia (2 s, 409 bps/lead),
MIT-Compression (2.7 s, 309 bps/lead), SCCN-EEG (3.3 s,
474 bps/channel).
 4096 samples/block for ofﬂine transmission, which produces
longer delays but more efﬁcient signal transmission: MIT-
Arrhythmia (12 s, 373 bps/lead), MIT-Compression (17 s,
282 bps/lead), SCCN-EEG (22.3 s, 389 bps/channel). Besides the
metadata transmission rate is reduced to one eighth with this
conﬁguration.
The signal compression, described in Section 2.1, begins with
the wavelet transformation of the signal block. The Coiﬂet ﬁlter
with 12 coefﬁcients was chosen for this transformation, since it ob-
tains higher compression efﬁciency than others (e.g. Daubechies
with 20 coefﬁcients) and offers a good tradeoff between the num-
ber of operations and the quality of the reconstructed signal. The
wavelet decomposition level was set to 6 because we observed that
the compression efﬁciency improves notably until this level but
not in the following.
The protection scheme, described in Section 2.3, introduces
overhead due to the need of including a Digital Signature (DS) in
each signal register (see Fig. 2). Several signature algorithms pro-
vide similar security with different DS length: DSA [38] (1024,
2048, 4096) and ECDSA [39] (192, 224, 339) generate signatures
sized in the range [0.05,0.06] KB, while RSA [37] (1024, 2048,
4096) signatures result much longer {0.13, 0.26,0.51} KB. To reduce
the overhead, only DSA and ECDSA signatures are allowed.
3.4. Embedding capacity
We deﬁne embedding capacity (EC) as the amount of metadata
that can be embedded with our encoding method when using
the same bandwidth as for transmitting the signal uncompressed.
The ECi (per lead/channel) of different ECG and EEG signals are
shown in Table 5. In most cases the overall EC (e.g. P77.7 MB in
ambulatory recordings 25.9 MB  3 leads- or P2.15 MB in stress
tests 178.9 KB 12 leads) far exceeds the size that containers 1–
6 require to enable e-health services, estimated in Table 4. The dif-
ference is what it is saved in transmission and storage, typically
’70–80% of the original size.
Each signal register j from a lead/channel i has its own embed-
ding capacity, ECij (depicted in Fig. 4a), resulting from the differ-
ence between the sizes of the original signal block and the
corresponding signal register (SPIHT bitframe, secure frame and
tail). The ECi(t) of a lead/channel i, illustrated in Fig. 4b, is the
sum of the ECij of the blocks 1 to j transmitted/stored until t. The
size of the RC, embedded in the ﬁrst signal register, corresponds
to the negative offset in Fig. 4b. The embedding capacity of a
lead/channel can be approximated as:
ECiðtÞ ¼ ðsampling freq  bit res compressed signal bitrate
 sizeðDSÞ
block length
Þ  t  sizeðRCÞ: ð4Þ
To build Table 5, we used this approximation. The sampling fre-
quencies of the signals and their resolutions were consulted in Sec-
tion 3.1, the compressed signal bitrates in Table 3, the size of the DS
(we considered ECDSA 239) in Table 4 and the block length was cal-
culated with Eq. (3).
4. Implementation and use
The implementation of the encoding and access architec-
ture, depicted in Figs. 1 and 2, is openly available at
Table 2
Average delay of the system operations.
Parameters Delay (ms)
Database Block
length
PRD
(%)
Del./ seiz.
det.
Cmp. Cont.- level
encr.
DS Tr. DS
check
Dec. RBAC
access
Sub
total
Block length(t),
see Eq. (3)
Total
Arrhythmia (ECG) 512 9 13 0.2 360 30 0.2 30 0.1 180 613.2 1422 2035.2
Compression (ECG) 512 9 13 0.3 360 30 0.2 30 0.1 180 613.2 2048 2661.2
SCCN (EEG) 512 7 156 0.3 360 30 0.4 30 0.1 180 756.4 2560 3316.4
Arrhythmia (ECG) 4096 9 37 2.4 360 30 1.3 30 1.2 180 638.3 11,380 12018.3
Compression (ECG) 4096 9 37 3.2 360 30 1.8 30 1.5 180 638.8 16,380 17018.8
SCCN (EEG) 4096 7 1248 3.0 360 30 3.1 30 1.4 180 1851.1 20,480 22331.1
Abbreviations: del./seiz. det. is ECG delineation/ EEG seizure detection, comp. is SPIHT compression, cont.-level encr. is container-level encryption, DS is calculating the digital
signature of the signal register, tr. is transmitting the signal register using HSUPA at 5.76 Mbps, DS check is checking the digital signature, dec. is SPIHT decompression, RBAC
access is decrypting the containers allowed to the intended user.
Table 3
Encoded signal bitrate to maintain constant distortion after embedding secure frames (SF) with different elements.
Parameters Average compressed signal bitrate -bps/lead- +metadata bitrate -bps/lead-
(overall compression ratio)
Database Block
length
PRD
(%)
No SF DS only Cont. 1 & DS RC, cont.1, cont. 2–6
(3 KB) & DS
RC, cont. 1, cont. 2–6
(6 KB) & DS
RC, cont. 1, cont. 2–6
(10 KB) & DS
Arrhythmia (ECG) 512 9 409.4 409.7 + 368.9 410.6 + 648.6 422.0 + 2809 422.5 + 4969 422.2 + 7849
(9.67) (5.09) (3.74) (1.23) (0.73) (0.48)
Compression (ECG) 512 9 309.2 307.7 + 256.0 308.2 + 536.0 317.1 + 2036 316.8 + 3536 317.0 + 5536
(9.70) (5.32) (3.55) (1.27) (0.78) (0.51)
SCCN (EEG) 512 7 474.2 459.3 + 204.8 459.2 + 252.8 473.1 + 1453 472.7 + 2653 472.8 + 4253
(4.64) (3.31) (3.09) (1.14) (0.70) (0.47)
Arrhythmia (ECG) 4096 9 372.5 372.7 + 46.1 372.8 + 326.1 387.7 + 596.1 387.6 + 866.1 387.5 + 1226
(10.63) (9.46) (5.67) (4.03) (3.16) (2.45)
Compression (ECG) 4096 9 282.0 282.1 + 32.0 282.3 + 312.0 290.5 + 499.5 290.5 + 687.0 290.5 + 937.0
(10.64) (9.55) (5.05) (3.80) (3.07) (2.44)
SCCN (EEG) 4096 7 388.6 386.6 + 25.6 386.3 + 73.6 395.2 + 223.6 394.8 + 373.6 394.9 + 573.6
(5.66) (5.34) (4.78) (3.56) (2.86) (2.27)
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ules: a standard 1D SPIHT coder-decoder (see Section 2.1), whose
optimal parameters of (real-time/ofﬂine) operation were studied
in Section 3.3; a Graphical User Interface (GUI) to build/access
the secure frames and some simple codes to embed the secure
frames and retrieve them from the signal registers (see Section 2.2).
As illustrated in Fig. 5, the design of the GUI is rather simple and
intuitive, to encourage the use even among userswith little techni-
cal knowledge. It facilitates the encoding of additional measures
and data of the patient in the corresponding containers, the assign-
ment of role-based access proﬁles to intended users (physicians,
researchers, teachers, etc.) and the protection of the resulting signal
registers. All the corresponding operations of ciphering, decipher-Table 4
Typical size (KB) of the containers in a secure frame.
Recovery container (RC), deﬁned in Table 1 Rest of contai
Agent’s cert RC-Tag 0 RC-Tag 2 signal register
ECDSA 192 0.6 0.05 0.05
ECDSA 224 0.6 0.06 0.06
ECDSA 239 0.6 0.06 0.06
DSA 1024 1.1 0.05 0.05
DSA 2048 1.6 0.05 0.05
DSA 4096 2.6 0.05 0.05
RC-Tags 1, 3–5 User’s cert RC-Tag 6 Containers 2–
0.007 RSA 1024 0.13  #users 3–10
RSA 2048 0.26  #users
RSA 4096 0.51  #usersing, signing and checking are carried out by the GUI. However,
some interaction is required:
 With the agent who encodes the signal registers, he/she must:
1. load the SPIHT bitframes;
2. load the content of the data container/s (1–6), some may be
empty;
3. load the certiﬁcates of the users and indicate their RBAC
proﬁles (0–5);
4. load his/her digital certiﬁcate, if desired change the default
hash function and the ciphering algorithm;
5. load his/her password-protected private key;
6. save the resulting signal registers.ners
DS Database Block length Container 1
Arrhythmia (ECG) 512 0.053
Compression (ECG) 512 0.076
SCCN (EEG) 512 0.012
Arrhythmia (ECG) 4096 0.421
Compression (ECG) 4096 0.606
SCCN (EEG) 4096 0.098
6
Table 5
Average embedding capacity (ECi) per lead/channel of different ECGs and EEGs.
Test and duration Signal database Samples/block ECi
Resting ECG, 10 s Arrhythmia 512 66.5% (3.2 KB)
Arrhythmia 4096 75.6% (3.7 KB)
Compression 512 63.0% (2.3 KB)
Compression 4096 71.3% (2.6 KB)
Resting ECG, 30 s Arrhythmia 512 75.7% (11.0 KB)
Arrhythmia 4096 84.8% (12.3 KB)
Compression 512 75.1% (8.3 KB)
Compression 4096 83.5% (9.2 KB)
Stress ECG, 10 min Arrhythmia 512 80.1% (232.4 KB)
Arrhythmia 4096 89.2% (258.7 KB)
Compression 512 80.9% (177.8 KB)
Compression 4096 89.2% (196.1 KB)
Ambulatory ECG, 24 h Arrhythmia 512 80.3% (33.6 MB)
Arrhythmia 4096 89.4% (37.4 MB)
Compression 512 81.2% (25.7 MB)
Compression 4096 89.5% (28.3 MB)
Epilepsy detection (EEG), 30 min SCCN-EEG 512 69.7% (336.8 KB)
SCCN-EEG 4096 81.1% (392.2 KB)
Polysomnographic study (EEG), 6.5 h SCCN-EEG 512 69.8% (4.4 MB)
SCCN-EEG 4096 81.3% (5.1 MB)
Fig. 4. Embedding capacity (EC) per ECG register (a) and per lead (b) of two ECGs
from MIT-Arrhythmia and MIT-Compression and an EEG from SSCN-EEG. ECGs
compressed with PRD = 9%, EEG with PRD = 7%, block length = 512 samples, wavelet
decomposition level = 6.
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1. load the signal registers;
2. export the Private Access Table to check his/her RBAC pro-
ﬁle (if desired);
3. load his/her password-protected private key (only if he/she
is allowed to access containers 2–6);
4. save the container/s that he/she is allowed to access.
These interactions with agents and users could be minimized
by deﬁning system conﬁguration proﬁles. Due to the crypto-
graphic operations involved, it is necessary that each agent
and each user possess his/her own digital certiﬁcate (and the
coupled password-protected private key). However, this require-
ment did not decrease the experience of the consulted physi-
cians, who pointed out that the GUI was easy to handle. The
certiﬁcates associated with electronic IDs are valid for this
purpose.
5. Conclusions
The proposed encoding and access architecture for 1D biomed-
ical signals looks for user satisfaction, since it guarantees clinical
value of signals, permits real-time operation (overall delays about
2–3.3 s) and can be easily handled by PACS and users through an
intuitive interface that we provide. Besides, the system is very efﬁ-
cient and secure. It permits embedding large amounts of additional
information within the signal (e.g. ’3 KB per lead in resting ECGs,
’200 KB per lead in stress tests, ’30 MB per lead in ambulatory
ECGs), detecting corruption of the signal or the information and
implementing different access levels for a variety of professional
roles. The compression ratio achieved by the encoding is quite high,
ranging from ’3 in real-time transmission to ’5 in ofﬂine opera-
tion, despite of the embedding of security elements and metadata
to enable e-health services.
In addition, this architecture could be extended to biomedi-
cal signals of higher dimension (e.g. 2D: MRIs, TACs, 3D: echo-
cardiograms), since the encoding relies on the SPIHT algorithm.
This would only require changing to the adequate SPIHT modal-
ity (2D/3D), tuning the compression parameters and establishing
the distortion threshold for each new type of signal. Regarding
Fig. 5. Graphical User Interface to build and access secure frames, depicted in Fig. 2.
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graphic elements we plan to add watermarks as a security
supplement.
To sum up, this architecture fosters the secure and efﬁcient
storage, transmission and access to biomedical tests in healthcare
environments. Furthermore, most of the system features (high sig-
nal compression with clinical quality, real-time operation, embed-
ding within the signal, security with reduced overhead) are not
currently supported by well-established signal standards (e.g. DI-
COM waveform 30, SCP-ECG), which makes it a promising alterna-
tive for the development of new and upgrade of existing e-health
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